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Criminal Law and Procedure
by John 0. Cole*

The Georgia appellate courts wrote opinions in over 500 cases during
the year of the survey period, most of which were in the court of appeals.
The volumes in question in this survey are positively bloated with criminal appeals. Reading through them is a depressing experience for two reasons. First, something seems amiss in a system in which so many attorneys, judges, law clerks, other officials, printers, and trees participate in
an appellate process that for the most part changes nothing and has no
effect on the litigants. Second, while some of the appeals are meritless to
the point of frivolity, many have some colorable merit, and a lesser number have real merit. The court of appeals seems to have as a goal, not to
guard against abuses in the trial processes around the state and insure
that justice is done, as would seem appropriate, but to find a way, no
matter how strained, to defend the convictions in the lower courts or to
overturn acquittals when possible. The Supreme Court of Georgia needs
to find a way to intervene in some of these areas. I start with a litany of
cases in the area of search and seizure that demonstrate, I think, a disturbing lack of concern for established constitutional principles and the
individual rights of our citizenry.
I.
A.

FOURTH AMENDMENT

Search and Seizure

An example of the need for supreme court review of the court of appeals opinions is Jamison v. State.1 Jamison dealt with an airport stop on
a very thin drug courier profile that the officer himself admitted did not
present articulable suspicion of criminal activity. The agent, in spite of
appellant's cooperation, production of legitimate identification, and lack
of nervousness pressed appellant to consent to a body search several
* Professor of Law, Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University. Duke University
(A.B., 1958); Indiana University (M.A., 1962); University of Pennsylvania (J.D., 1970).
1. 199 Ga. App. 401, 405 S.E.2d 82 (1991).
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times after appellant had refused permission. Finally, appellant took two
running steps from the agent at which time the agent tackled him, subdued him, and searched him.2
The court of appeals, over three dissents and without significant analysis of any kind, upheld this process as a valid arrest based on probable
cause.3 The court thought that,
[a]ny challenge to the trial court's finding that probable cause existed for
defendant's arrest, utilizing defendant's version of the events leading to
his arrest and reasoning that defendant's "behavior in taking two running steps [does not evidence] the sort of consciousness of guilt to justify
characterizing his behavior as 'flight'" is illogical.'
Fortunately for all the citizens of Georgia and others that travel
through the air, this case did get to the supreme court.' The result was
predictable: a unanimous supreme court reversed the court of appeals in a
short per curiam opinion based on the dissenting opinion written by
Judge Sognier below. The court agreed with Judge Sognier that "appellant's two running steps from the non-custodial presence of an officer who
would not accept appellant's refusal as an answer could not have warranted a man of reasonable caution in the belief that a felony had been*
committed."' 7 The concurring Justices thought that the fact that an illegal
seizure had occurred before appellant ran was an independent reason to
suppress the evidence.8
The following cases from the survey period are my candidates for .supreme court review (and reversal).
In Brimer v State, the Sheriff's Department of Heard County, after
receiving an anonymous call concerning a party of underage persons
drinking and using drugs, decided to set up a roadblock about seventyfive yards from the house. The roadblock stopped vehicles traveling in
either direction. The police stopped appellant at the roadblock after appellant left the house where the party was taking place. The officer
smelled alcohol on appellant and noticed that his eyes were dilated.
While one deputy gave appellant a sobriety test, the other officer "leaned

2. Id. at 403-04, 405 S.E.2d at 84.

3. Id. at 405, 405 S.E.2d at 85.
4. Id. at 404, 405 S.E.2d at 84-85.
5. Jamison v. State, 262 Ga. 40, 414 S.E.2d 466 (1992).
6. Id. at 40, 414 S.E.2d at 467.

7. Id.
8. Id. at 41, 414 S.E.2d at 467.
9. 201 Ga. App. 401, 411 S.E.2d 128 (1991).
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in and looked '"1 into the van, "looked under, looked over between the
3
seats,"11 and found a small plastic pouch with white powder in it."
Serious constitutional problems exist here. Setting up a roadblock,
based on an an6nymous tip concerning a party and stopping everyone
that drives by, to check persons leaving the party suspected of criminal
activity raises fundamental questions concerning the power of the police
in a free society. Since they could not have stopped any particular person
at the party based on this tip, it might seem to a casual observer that
neither could they stop all of the participants under the pretext of a
roadblock. In addition, leaning into a van to have a look around under a
general policy to check any place anybody in the vehicle could reach for a
weapon, with no evidence that the occupants of the car were armed and
dangerous (the standard announced in Terry v. Ohio" and Michigan v.
Long"') might be supposed to be a further violation of appellant's constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment.
According to our court of appeals, the roadblock was not established as
a subterfuge or pretext to target the party goers at all! The roadblock was
just good police work by an "experienced senior officer"" and quite reasonable. What could be more reasonable than setting up a roadblock
whenever there is a vague suspicion that someone is up to no good? That
way a whole group of citizens who happen to be passing by can make a
contribution to the common good by being stopped and their vehicle
"leaned into." Even more surprisingly, when the officer testified that he
"leaned in"' 6 the van and "looked over between the seats'" to find the
contraband, that did not indicate "unequivocally that any portion of the
officer's body entered the. interior of the vehicle." 1' 8
In another case, Christopher v. State,9 the court of appeals upheld a
similar checkpoint, admitting that after receiving a call about a "loud
party," the police set up the roadblock specifically to stop drivers leaving
a party.20 The officers did warn the host of the party, who apparently did
not pass along the warning to the guests, and the police found appellant
to be intoxicated and in possession of alcohol.2
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id. at 403, 411 S.E.2d at 130.
Id. at 404, 411 S.E.2d at 130.
Id. at 401, 411 S.E.2d at 129.
392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
463 U.S. 1032, 1048 (1983).
201 Ga. App. at 403, 411 S.E.2d at 130.
Id.
Id. at 404, 411 S.E.2d at 130.
Id.
202 Ga. App. 40, 413 S.E.2d 236 (1991).
Id. at 41, 413 S.E.2d at 237.
Id.
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These cases represent a significant extension of Michigan Department
of State Police v. Sitz, 2 on which they are ostensibly based. Sitz itself
was based on checkpoints set up under specific guidelines developed by a
state advisory committee that set forth procedures to be utilized; in our
case, the checkpoints are set up in the discretion of the officer in charge.
The court shows little or no sensitivity to the effect the holdings will have
on what we consider to be the essentials of our free society. The result?
Do not drive near parties, bars, drug neighborhoods, or any group of underage persons, unless you are totally law-abiding, wear clean underwear,
and have nothing that would embarrass you if seen by the police. The
police could, at any time, stop your car at a "roadblock," "lean into it,"
(or see the floor between the seats without leaning into it) and embarrass
and harass you before allowing you to leave (99% of the cases?) or arrest
you.
- Another case that needs review is Bailey v. State.2 3 In Bailey appellant
made the crucial mistake of turning into a church parking lot at 8:05 p.m.
one evening when the church was closed, and, to compound that suspicious behavior, leaned down in the seat. An officer, who became suspicious when he saw appellant turn into the lot and decided to follow him,
stopped appellant.24 Is leaning down in the car on a church lot an articulable fact which would lead a reasonable person to believe that criminal
activity was afoot? The court of appeals thought that these "furtive and
suspicious movements on the deserted church property at night justified"
the police intervention.2
In O'Donnell v. State,2 the well-known (to appellate courts) 27 Trooper
Ralston struck again. He approached a vehicle parked in a rest area over
night to check on the person asleep, ostensibly to check his "'well-being.' "2 After satisfying himself that the person in the car was fine, the
officer asked for asked for some identification .2 There is no reason why
the trooper should require identification in such a case and no right to
such information. Appellant "voluntarily" produced a valid drivers license, but it turned out that the car was not registered to the driver.2 "

22. 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
23. 202 Ga. App. 427, 414 S.E.2d 330 (1992).
24. Id. at 427-28, 414 S.E.2d at 331.
25. Id. at 428, 414 S.E.2d at 331.
26. 200 Ga. App. 829, 409 S.E.2d 579 (1991).
27. See Lombardo v. State, 287 Ga. App. 440, 370 S.E.2d 503 (1988); Partridge v. State,
187 Ga. App. 325, 370 S.E.2d 173 (1988); Spencer v. State, 186 Ga. App. 54, 366 S.E.2d 390
(1988); Whisnant v. State, 185 Ga. App. 51, 363 S.E.2d 341 (1987); and Steward v. State, 182
Ga. App. 659, 356 S.E.2d 890 (1987).
28. 200 Ga. App. at 829, 409 S.E.2d at 580.
29. Id.
30. Id.
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Although this author personally knows of no law that makes it a crime to
drive a car that you do not own, Trooper Ralston's suspicions were
aroused, and he asked for an explanation. Appellant gave a reasonable
explanation that the car was loaned to him by a friend, and the officer
held him there while he tried the number. The officer got only the
friend's answering machine, which might be thought to be a verification
of appellant's story. About twenty-three minutes after the initial contact,
appellant "consented" to the search and dismantling of the car. Drugs
were found in the left rear quarter panel of the car."1 The majority of the
court of appeals held that driving a car from out-of-state that is owned by
someone else constitutes a reasonable and articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot, and thus detaining appellant for investigation is allowable.82 Thus, appellant's "voluntary" consent was fine and not tainted
by an illegal stop.38 Three judges dissented, pointing out that the only
basis for the stop beyond the initial check was that appellant seemed nervous, one of the characteristics of the drug courier profile."' Clearly no
articulable and reasonable suspicion exists in this case to justify such a
detention, and the dissenters are right in their assessment of the case.
How many such "stops" has Trooper Ralston made in which no evidence
of crime turned up? That is the true cost of the court's cavalier validation
of this intrusion on a traveler on Georgia's highways. Our laws clearly are
not'designed to protect the O'Donnells of the world in such a situation;
the court should be thinking of the innocent citizens that are stopped and
harassed based on no more than a fishing expedition.
In State v. Jackson, 5 the facts, as characterized by the dissent, were:
Here, the officers saw a car belonging to someone with whom they had
no previous contact carrying two otherwise unidentified people leaving
the home of one suspected of but never charged with selling drugs. The
suspected person was not seen at the house while the unidentified persons were present, only a truck owned by him. No contact between the
truck and car occupants was observed.
The officers then followed these unidentified persons to the address of
Kendrick, although they did not know Kendrick was in the car when
they pulled up the driveway and blocked in the car. When the occupants
got out of the car, they were placed in the police car's headlights and
questioned. A marked police car was also present.
There was no anonymous tip, details of which were corroborated by
the officers' observation .... There was no identity of the car's occu-

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 829-30, 409 S.E.2d at 580-81.
Id. at 832, 409 S.E,2d at 582.
Id. at 833, 409 S.E.2d at 582.
Id. at 835, 409 S.E.2d at 584.
201 Ga. App. 810, 412 S.E.2d 593 (1991).
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pants at the time the initial approach to them was made, by encroaching
on the property of Kendrick to block Jackson's car. When they got out of
the car, they were told what to do and they complied, submitting to the
assertion of authority by the officers, including the presence of the
marked car. ....
.6
The officers who pulled into the yard of appellant were in plainclothes,
wearing blue jeans. The time was approximately 9:00 p.m. on a January
7
evening.
By what conceivable right does a police officer, in these United States
or the State of Georgia, pull into the yard of a citizen on a dark winter
night, illuminate the owner of the property in the car's headlights, tell the
homeowner and the driver of the car that the officers were conducting a
drug investigation, and ask the startled driver if "he would allow him to
search his person and his vehicle . ..?,,8" This scenario has the ring of
oppressive regimes across the seas in "foreign lands"-a story we tell our
kids to contrast our society from the bad ones. This scenario simply
should not be permissible, under existing constitutional interpretations of
the Fourth Amendment, without probable cause or reasonable suspicion
that the individuals have committed or are committing a crime.
The trial court could find no basis for such police overreaching and
granted the motion to suppress as to Kendrick, the owner of the property. 9 The court of appeals overruled the trial court, three judges dissenting.'" According to the majority, "there is no evidence that Kendrick had
a possessory interest or an expectation of privacy in Jackson's vehicle and
there is no evidence that the searching law enforcement officers were unlawfully in Kendrick's yard. 1" Therefore, Kendrick lacked standing to
object to the search.42 Actually, no evidence shows that the officers were
lawfully in Kendrick's yard, unless the court is saying on the facts mentioned above that the officers had reasonable suspicion that the occupants
of the automobile were involved in criminal activity-a conclusion that
the court could not reach. So, how could the officers be lawfully in the
yard? No answer appears in the majority's analysis. Quickly skipping on
to the next point, the court held that no seizure occurred here, even temporarily, because it was all consensual and, as the majority points out,
"Kendrick did not request the law enforcement officers to leave her front

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 816-17, 412 S.E.2d at 597-98 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
201 Ga. App. at 810-11, 412 S.E.2d at 593-94.
Id. at 811, 412 S.E.2d at 594.
Id. at 812, 412 S.E.2d at 594.
Id. at 814, 412 S.E.2d at 597.
Id. at 813, 412 S.E.2d at 595.
Id.
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yard. 4 8 The lesson here is that when police officers in blue jeans drive
into your yard and start asking questions on a dark wintry night, be sure
to ask them to leave.
Judge Andrews in the dissent suggests the obvious-" [c]ertainly a
homeowner has the right to expect that the curtilage of her property will
not be breached by the police save with a warrant or upon probable
cause."4 4 He thought it clear that on these facts, an illegal seizure had
occurred."
In Merriman v State," officers went to a certain address based on an
anonymous tip. They found a high fence around the property, so they
moved to a heavily wooded area in the back of the house and looked
through a crack in the fence. They saw what looked like marijuana growing in the yard and, as they were leaving, they saw a light-haired person
above the fence who ducked down. The officers decided to knock on the
door and enter the house without a warrant, so that evidence would not
be destroyed. Appellant's wife opened the door, and the officers went in,
arrested her, and searched the house.' First, were the officers on the
property of the appellant when they looked through the fence; and if so,
was this a true "open fields" case?46 It did not matter to the court
whether the officers were trespassing when they saw the marijuana because it "appeared" that the fence belonged to the neighboring lot."

Second, and more important, can the officers enter the house without a
search warrant based on "exigent circumstances" because they saw someone over the wall?"0 They knew at that point that marijuana was growing
in the back yard and someone had seen them snooping around the
fence. " ' Is that enough to dispense with a search warrant? Yes, said the
court, "there were facts within their knowledge such as to warrant a prudent man to believe that the wife had committed or was committing an
offense.""2 That rationale, of course, completely disregards Payton v. New
York 53 to name one of many relevant cases, and is no support for dispensing with a warrant. The court went on to say that "[t]he trial court also
concluded that the officers reasonably believed that they were confronted
with an emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain search war43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 812, 412 S.E.2d at 595.
Id. at 816, 412 S.E.2d at 597 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
Id. at 817, 412 S.E.2d at 598 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
201 Ga. App. 817, 412 S.E.2d 598 (1991).
Id. at 817-18, 412 S.E.2d at 599-600.
Id. at 819, 412 S.E.2d at 600.
Id., 412 S.E.2d at 601.
Id. at 821, 412 S.E.2d at 602.
Id. at 818, 412 S.E.2d at 599.
Id. at 821, 412 S.E.2d at 602.
445 U.S. 573 (1980).
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rants threatened the destruction of evidence. ' 54 The court cited Schmerber v. California," for this statement. Is the court implying that growing
marijuana is "evanescent" evidence? Based on this case, police officers
should be able to dispense altogether with warrants if they have probable
cause to believe that drugs or other contraband is inside a home and,
having stationed themselves outside the house, they see someone looking
back at them!
In Perry v. State," a theft by receiving case out of Fulton County, police misbehavior was at issue.57 The question of police lying under oath in
motions to suppress and at trials is so well documented and so much the
experience of every prosecutor and defense attorney around the country
that little needs to be said about the phenomena.5 8 The dilemma concerning police lying is that a judge can hardly believe the defendant's version
as a matter of course against the police officer: the defendant has even
more incentive to stretch the truth than the officer. But the problem of
police lying is real and enduring, and a conscientious court must be alert
to that possibility.
In Perry a police officer testified that he and his partner approached a
parked car that he "suspected" was stolen. The officer testified, presumably under oath, that he had obtained verification at the time of the arrest
that the car was in fact stolen. This testimony ran into some trouble
when it was pointed out that the car had not been reported stolen at the
time of the arrest. This awkward little fact was easily handled by the
court of appeals: this "lie" under oath "could simply have been the product of misinformation or misrecollection" 5' 9 and since the car had in fact
been stolen, there was really no reason to worry about the officer's story
about it. Besides, the appellant did not object at trial so the conviction
stands.60 The officer's mother might style this story just a "misrecollection" and we would expect her to do so in the defense of her son, but
courts are not the police officers' mothers and we -have a right to expect
more objectivity concerning their credibility than this opinion exhibits.
The "yellow line" cases are concededly difficult to deal with on appeal,
because there is always a chance that the defendant did in fact inadvertently stray over the line. But, again, some sensitivity to the problem
would help. As it is, any person in the state who looks slightly suspicious
and allows his or her wheels to wander over the center line of the road
54.

201 Ga. App. at 821, 412 S.E.2d at 602.

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966).
201 Ga. App. 1, 410 S.E.2d 297 (1991).
Id. at 1-2, 410 S.E.2d at 297.
See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) and its progeny.
201 Ga. App. at 1-2, 410 S.E.2d at 298.
Id. at' 2, 410 S.E.2d at 298.
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while driving," is fair game to the police. Whatever the officer finds after
such a search can and will be used against the occupant. As appellant
found out in Wise v. State s2 one should not drive under the speed limit
past a suspected crack house and then stray over the center line.63 Even
though the officer clearly would not stop a car that strayed over the
center line in the normal course of business, if he or she decides there is
some reason to check out the car, he or she can.
Thomas v. State6 concerns another "yellow line" example. In Thomas
the officer testified that he began to follow a maroon Mercedes with gold
rims because it matched the description of a "lookout" that he had received. The officer "forgot" the source of the lookout but when the driver
leaned over, the car crossed over the yellow line, and the officer immediately stopped the car." The court said that this was not a "pretextual"
stop because "the proper inquiry. . . is not whether the officer could validly have made the stop but whether under the same circumstances a
reasonable officer would have made the stop in the absence of the invalid
purpose. ' "
B.

Third Party Consent

A case that has excited some public attention concerns the right of a
ten-year-old to consent to a search of his mother and stepfathers house
where the ten-year-old lived. The boy, according to published accounts,
was shocked to find that he was not getting his parents help but merely
sending them to jail. s7
In Davis v. State," the appellant's ten-year-old stepson called the police and reported that there were drugs in the house belonging to his
mother and stepfather and he wanted to get some help. He told the police
that his mother would be home about 4:30 p.m. that day and asked for
someone to come before then. A deputy was dispatched to the house and
the boy led her to the bedroom and showed her the drugs, which she
seized.66 The stepfather's probation was revoked because of this search

61. Or, perhaps more accurately put, looks slightly suspicious to an officer who is willing
to testify that his or her wheels touched the center line.
62. 201 Ga. App. 412, 411 S.E.2d 303 (1991).
63. Id. at 412, 411 S.E.2d at 304.
64. 201 Ga. App. 292, 410 S.E.2d 786 (1991).
65. Id. at 292, 410 S.E.2d at 786-87.
66. Id. at 293, 410 S.E.2d at 787 (citing Tarwid v. State, 184 Ga. App. 853, 363 S.E.2d 63
(1987) although the pertinence of that case is obscure).
67. Mark Curriden, 'I thought police told the truth' Boy upset, confused by arrest of
parents, ATLANTA J., Oct. 10, 1992, at Al.
68. 202 Ga. App. 629, 414 S.E.2d 902 (1992).
69. Id. at 630, 414 S.E.2d at 902-03.
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and seizure, and the question on appeal concerned the propriety of the
stepson's consent to the search.7 0 The court of appeals assumed that a
search had taken place in this case. 1 The trial court had ruled that the
boy appeared "bright, articulate, and educated" and that his daily routine
as a "latch-key" child gave him the requisite authority to consent to the
search.7' The court of appeals, three judges dissenting, agreed, finding
that the criteria in Atkins78 for consent of a child under eighteen had
been met."4 In Atkins v. State,7 which concerned a seventeen-year-old
boy, the court identified several factors relevant to this issue: the minor's
control over the area searched, whether the minor lived on the premises,
whether the minor had the right of access to the premises and the right to
invite others in, whether the minor was old enough to act reasonably in
regards to the consent, and whether a reasonable officer would believe
that the minor could give a valid consent. 6 Several of these factors were
weak in Davis, but the court, interpreting the Atkins factors as consistent
with a "totality of the circumstance" approach, upheld the consent as
valid.' 7 The case is now before the Supreme Court of Georgia.
C. Inventory Searches
Inventory searches after an arrest and impoundment of an accused's
automobile or personal effects are legitimate and constitute a major
source of searching in places where the police would not otherwise have a
right to search.' 8 If an arrest is invalid, then the inventory search falls
with the bad arrest as a matter of course. 9 Thus, it is crucial to determine whether and under what conditions an accused is validly arrested.
For example, in a typical traffic violation case, may an officer arrest a
driver for a simple traffic violation or must he give him a citation as is
normally done? If an officer has the power, in his or her untrammelled
discretion, to arrest a driver for a traffic violation, then an officer has the
right, based on this untrammelled discretion, to conduct an inventory
search of the entire vehicle, including closed containers therein.8 0 It would

70.
71.
72.

Id., 414 S.E.2d at 902.
Id. at 630-31, 414 S.E.2d at 903.
Id. at 631, 414 S.E.2d at 903.

73. Atkins.v. State, 173 Ga. App. 9, 325 S.E.2d 388 (1992).
74. 202 Ga. App. at 631-32, 414 S.E.2d at 903-04.
75. 173 Ga. App. 9, 325 S.E.2d 388 (1992).
76. Id. at 22, 325 S.E.2d at 390.
77. 202 Ga. App. at 632, 414 S.E.2d at 904.
78.

New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).

79. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) and its progeny.
80. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S.
1032 (1983).
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be wise policy, then, to cabin the discretion of officers in this regard so
that drivers who for some reason antagonize an officer or give the officer
some weak reason to suspect the driver would not be subject to the whim
of the police officer in such a case.
In two cases decided the same day, Judge Beasley and Judge Carley
argued about this policy concerning the officer's right to make a custodial
arrest in any case that the officer chooses without judicial or legislative
guidance. In Baker v.State,1 Judge Carley wrote for the court and upheld an officer's right to arrest anyone he or she wished after spotting a
traffic violation under the authority of Official Code of Georgia Annotated
("O.C.G.A.") sections 17-4-23(a) and 17-4-20. 81 The Baker majority relied
on Polk v. State,'3 which so held without analysis or discussion. 8 4 Appellant sought to curtail the officer's discretion by appealing to O.C.G.A. section 17-6-11(a) which states that,"
Any other laws to the contrary not withstanding, any person who is
arrested by an officer for the violation of laws of this state or ordinances
relating to 1) traffic . . .upon being served with the official summons

issued by such arresting officer, in lieu of being immediately brought
before the proper magistrate, recorder, or other judicial officer ...

may

deposit his driver's license with the apprehending officer in lieu of bail
... or in lieu of being incarcerated by the arresting officer .... 6

Judge Carley and the majority read this statute to apply only to the case
in which the officer had decided not to make a custodial arrest and thus
had no relevance to the question of the officer's untrammelled discretion
to custodially arrest the driver.8 7 Judge Beasley, unfortunately the only
dissenting voice in this case, points out that the majority's analysis renders O.C.G.A. section 17-6-11"1 meaningless, since if the officer decides to
issue a citation under O.C.G.A. section 17-4-23(a) then the terms of
O.C.G.A. section 17-6-11 do not apply, because such a person would not
be faced with the prospect of being taken in before a magistrate.89 In
addition, Judge Beasley writes that the legislative history supports her
contention that "the legislature intended to provide a simpler and less
invasive and less disruptive procedure for assuring attendance at court, of
those charged with certain vehicle-connected offenses, than full booking
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

202 Ga. App.
Id. at 74, 413
200 Ga. App.
Id. at 18, 406
202 Ga. App.

73, 413 S.E.2d 251 (1991).
S.E.2d at 252; O.C.G.A. §§ 17-4-20 (Supp. 1992) & 17.4-23(a) (1990).
17, 406 S.E.2d 548 (1991).
S.E.2d at 549.
at 74, 413 S.E.2d at 252.

86. O.C.G.A. § 17-6-11(a) (1992).
87. 202 Ga. App. at 74, 413 S.E.2d at 252.
88. O.C.G.A. § 17-6-11 (1992).
89. 202 Ga. App. at 75-76, 413 S.E.2d at 253-54 (Beasley, J., dissenting).
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at the jail."9 Judge Carley, re-asserts his position in concurring dicta in
State v. Lamb,91 without really responding to Judge Beasley's arguments. 2 The supreme court or the legislature needs to look at.this controversy and, hopefully, put some brakes on the majority's holding that
police can arrest and inventory search or not, on their hunch or intuition.
In Swanson v. State,93 an officer received an anonymous tip "that a
dark-skinned black man wearing a 'kangol' hat, a sweater and jeans was
selling drugs" at a certain location.' 4 The officer went to the address and
saw a man fitting that description. He approached the man and patted
him down for weapons, including crunching his hat to see if there were
any weapons therein. Cocaine fell out of the hat and the appellant was
arrested." The court of appeals, Judge Sognier writing the opinion, reversed the conviction 6 finding that under Alabama v. White,97 this anonymous tip was not enough to justify the stop. 8 White makes clear that
detailed descriptions relating to easily obtainable public facts are not sufficient to justify the stop; what is needed in such a situation is knowledge
of facts that could not be known by observation, for example, the future
movements of the individual.
II. MERGER

In Edge v. State," the supreme court announced a new merger rule in a
felony murder case.'0 0 Appellant in this case shot and killed his estranged
wife with a hand gun. A jury convicted him of felony murder, voluntary
manslaughter, and the possession of a firearm during the commission of a
crime. His sentence was life imprisonment and a term of years. The appellant argued that the trial court erred when it entered a verdict for
voluntary manslaughter and felony murder, both of which were based on
the same aggravated assault.10 ' The supreme court agreed and reversed
the conviction for felony murder. 0 2 The court refused to follow the rule
-that exists in most states which precludes a felony murder conviction
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id., 413 S.E.2d at 253.
202 Ga. App. 69, 413 S.E.2d 511 (1991).
Id. at 71, 413 S.E.2d at 513.
201 Ga. App. 896, 412 S.E.2d 630 (1991).
Id. at 896-97, 412 S.E.2d at 631.
Id. at 897, 412 S.E.2d at 631.
Id. at 899, 412 S.E.2d at 632.
496 U.S. 325 (1990).,
Id. at 332.
261 Ga. 865, 414 S.E.2d 463 (1992).
Id. at 867, 414 S.E.2d at 465.
Id. at 865, 414 S.E.2d at 464.
Id.
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based upon an aggravated assault directed against the person who was
killed. 103 The court did, however, adopt a more reasonable rule than has
been the case in Georgia and held that a felony murder conviction is precluded only when it would prevent an otherwise warranted verdict of voluntary manslaughter.1 04 Under this holding the charge to the jury must
be given with careful precision. 10 5 The trial court should not give a sequential charge requiring the jury to consider voluntary manslaughter
only if it is considered and found the defendant not guilty of malice murder and felony murder, but, instead, should instruct the jury so as to insure adequate consideration of charges for both forms of homicide.",
Thus, as Rufus Witherspoon found out in Witherspoon v. State,07 one
may still be convicted of felony murder, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a
crime, without proving malice in the killing at all.'0 8
III.

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES

In Noland v. State,09 appellant argued that he had ineffective assistance of counsel because, among other things, his counsel failed to challenge the constitutionality of O.C.G.A. section 40-6-270(b).1 0 This statute
makes the failure to stop or return to the scene of an accident a felony if
the accident is the proximate cause of death or serious injury as defined
in section 33-34-2."' Appellant's argued that "permitting the offense of
leaving the scene to be elevated to a felony, based solely on the amount of
medical expenses subsequently incurred by the victim, ...

violated due

process requirements of definiteness and certainty. '" 2 The appellate
court, finding that appellant had a colorable claim that the statute was
unconstitutional under due process principles, transferred the case to the
supreme court.'" The supreme court returned the case to the appellate
court, finding that the constitutionality of O.C.G.A. section 40-6-270(b)
was not directly presented to or decided by the trial court and was merely
hypothetical in the context of the appeal." 4 On remand to the court of
103.

Id. at 867, 414 S.E.2d at 465.

104. Id.
105. Id..
106. Id., 414 S.E.2d at 466.
107. 262 Ga. 2, 412 S.E.2d 829 (1992).
108.

Id. at 2-3, 412 S.E.2d at 830.

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

202 Ga. App. 125, 413 S;E.2d 509 (1991).
Id. at 125, 413 S.E.2d at 509.
Id.
Id. at 126, 413 S.E.2d at 510.
Id.
Id.at 125-26, 413 S.E.2d at 510.
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appeals, the court stated that the contention concerning the constitutionality appeared, on its face, to have at least colorable merit but refused to
address it since the court was without jurisdiction to adjudicate the constitutionality of a statute."' This argument will undoubtedly be raised
again.
In Aman v. State,11 6 appellant attacked the constitutionality of
O.C.G.A. section 16-12-100(b)(8),' 7 which provides: "It is unlawful for
any person knowingly to possess or control any material which depicts a
minor engaged in any sexually explicit conduct." 8 The court upheld the
statute but made clear that "the statutory term 'depict a minor' must be
understood as limited to any photographic representation that was made
of a human being who at that time was a minor and was 'engaged in any
sexually explicit conduct,' as defined by the statute."', Thus, possession
of art literature or other constitutionally protected works depicting children in sexually explicit conduct are not reached by this statute when the
material is possessed in the person's own home.
In Langton v. State, 20 appellant appealed a conviction for criminal
trespass. Appellant was charged with remaining in the parking lot of a
Georgia Department of Labor facility after being asked to leave.' 2 ' She
was convicted under O.C.G.A. section 16-7-21(b), which states that "a
person commits the offense of criminal trespass when he knowingly and
without authority

. .

.[r]emains upon the . ..premises of another . ..

after receiving notice from the owner, rightful occupant, or, upon proper
identification, an authorized representative of the owner or a rightful occupant to depart. 122 Appellant argues that this statute, as applied to her
presence on state-owned property, violates the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution. The court agreed with the appellant's argument that if she had a First'Amendment right to engage in expressive
activity in the parking lot of the Georgia Department of Labor facility,
then she could not be convicted of criminal trespass because the state
would not be able to prove that she was in the parking lot "without authority." At the trial, a state witness testified that the appellant was
asked to leave the Department of Labor premises because-of an unidentified regulation forbidding the distribution of all written communication
115.

Id.

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

261 Ga. 669, 409 S.E.2d 645 (1991).
Id. at 670, 409 S.E.2d at 646.
O.C.G.A. § 16-12-100(b)(8) (1992).
261 Ga. at 670, 409 S.E.2d at 646.
261 Ga. 878, 413 S.E.2d 708 (1992).
Id. at 878, 413 S.E.2d at 708.
O.C.G.A. § 16-7-21(b) (1992).
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on all state property. "8 The court found it "self-evident that a total ban
on written expression on all state property, without regard to the intended use of any particular sites, some of which are certainly the parks
and public streets considered traditional public fora, would be unreasonable." 124 Thus, the court held that the purported restriction on distribution of written communication on state property was unconstitutional.",
The court was careful to note that the holding only reached the asserted
restriction on which the appellant's conviction was based and carefully
expressed no opinion regarding any other restrictions on the use of stateowned property for expressive purposes. " '
IV. DEATH PENALTY

In Jones v. State,' the supreme court announced a new rule concerning change of venue in death penalty cases, which is, by all accounts wiser
and fairer than its predecessor rule. "8 Prior to Jones, the supreme court
followed a standard laid down in Berryhill v. State, 2 9 which stated that
the proper test for change of venue is a determination of whether a prospective juror could lay aside his impression or opinion derived from pretrial publicity and render a verdict on the evidence in the case. 80 Justice
Weltner, speaking for the majority in Jones, stated that:
The approach followed in Berryhill and our earlier cases concerning
change of venue in death penalty cases is, we believe, too restrictive. Our
inquiries have been laborious, and often have yielded what might appear
to be distinctions without differences. The history of the noted "Alday
murders" demonstrates the agonies of retrials. We need a better and
surer rule.
...Accordingly, we announce a new standard. Trial courts will order
a change of venue for death penalty trials in those cases in which a defendant can make a substantive
showing of the likelihood of prejudice by
12
reason of extensive publicity.3
This new rule was made effective on January 16, 1992.182
123.

261 Ga. at 878, 413 S.E.2d at 709.
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Id. at 879, 413 S.E.2d at 710.
Id.at 879-80, 413 S.E.2d at 710.
Id. at 880, 413 S.E.2d at 710.
261 Ga. 665, 409 S.E.2d 642 (1991).
Id. at 666, 409 S.E.2d at 643.
249 Ga. 442, 291 S.E.2d 685 (1982).
Id. at 443, 291 S.E.2d at 689.
261 Ga. at 666, 409 S.E.2d at 643.
Id. at 666 n.4, 409 S.E.2d at 643 n.4.
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In Bennett v. State,8 8 the supreme court reached out to affirm a death

penalty conviction in spite of the fact, according to Justice Benham in
dissent, that two jurors made it "abundantly clear that they were of the
firm opinion that a conviction for malice murder called for the death penalty no matter what the defense might produce in mitigation." 18 4 Both
jurors apparently testified that there was nothing which the defense could
show that would make them vote for life imprisonment if the evidence
showed the defendant was guilty of malice murder." 6 Because both jurors
stated they would obey the trial court's instructions and consider the evidence in mitigation, the majority found no error in allowing them to sit
on the jury.1 3 Justice Benham points out that in Cofield v. State,187 the

court stated that: "[It is not sufficient that the juror be willing to 'consider' the death penalty if he or she is committed to automatically vote
against the death penalty after having 'considered' it."' Justice Benham
believed that the converse of "the holding in Cofield should be true it is
not sufficient that a juror be willing to 'consider' evidence in mitigation if
he or she is committed to vote automatically for 1the death penalty after
having 'considered' the mitigating circumstances."

3

V. TRIAL PROCEDURE
A.

Child Molestation Cases

In Rolader v. State,1 40 appellant was convicted of child molestation.
Appellant argued on appeal that his constitutional right to confront the
witness against him was violated by the introduction of certain statements made by his young daughter during the course of two videotaped
interviews conducted prior to trial. The child did not testify at the trial,
although she was available. 4 1 According to O.C.G.A. section 24-3-16, "[a]
statement made by a child under the age of fourteen years describing any
act of sexual conduct or physical abuse performed with or on the child by
another is admissible in evidence by the testimony of the person or persons to whom made if the child is available to testify in the proceedings
and the court finds that the circumstances of the statement provides
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
247 Ga.
139.
140.
141.

262 Ga. 149, 414 S.E.2d 218 (1992).
Id. at 155, 414 S.E.2d at 224.
Id. at 155-56, 414 S.E.2d at 224 (Benham, J., dissenting).
Id. at 155, 414 S.E.2d at 224 (Benham, J., dissenting).
247 Ga. 98, 274 S.E.2d 530 (1981).
262 Ga. at 156, 414 S.E.2d at 224 (Benham, J., dissenting) (quoting Cofield v. State,
98, 274 S.E.2d 530 (1981)).
Id. (Benham, J., dissenting).
202 Ga. App. 134, 413 S.E.2d 752 (1991).
Id. at 134, 413 S.E.2d at 753.
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sufficient indicia of reliability.'14 Since there was no question that appellant's daughter was "available to testify" in this case, the statutory
requirement of availability was met. 143 The court of appeals thought that
this statute raised serious concerns under the confrontation clause of the
Sixth Amendment, but did not resolve the issue, finding that the making
of the videotape statements in this case failed to establish their inherent
4
reliability.1 4

The problem with the Georgia statute lies in the fact that under welldeveloped constitutional principles, an out-of-court statement made in a
case such as this violates the confrontation clause unless (1) the witness is
unavailable, (rather than available as under the Georgia statute), and (2)
the statement bears adequate "indicia of reliability."""
In Hall v. State,14 1 the court found appellant guilty of two counts of
child molestation against his daughter. At the trial "[a]ppellant proffered
the testimony of two witnesses that. . . the victim had not exhibited the
'unusual and inappropriate behavior' typical of a sexually abused
child."1'

7

The state objected to this testimony, not on the basis of the

competency of the expert witnesses, but on the basis of the relevancy of
the testimony. The state asserted that since it could not put a witness on
the stand to testify that the victim did manifest the traits of a molested
child the defense should not be able to offer such testimony."48 The court
of appeals disagreed, finding that the "typical" behavior of sexually
abused children is not within the ken of the average juror, and that the
testimony concerning the behavior of the child concerning that typically
displayed by a sexually abused child and did not go to the question of
whether this child had been molested. '4 The court thought it clear that
the state could introduce testimony of a duly qualified expert that a victim did exhibit the "typical" behavior of sexually abused children.'8 0
In Lang v. State,"" another child molestation case, the court allowed
the victim's mother and two police officers to testify to out-of-court statements made by the victim that identified the appellant as her molester.
The six-year old victim took the stand at the trial, but the trial court
struck her testimony and instructed the jury not to credit it on the basis
that she had not demonstrated that she understood the nature of the
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. at 138, 413 S.E.2d at 756 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 24-3-16 (Supp. 1992)).
Id. at 138-39, 413 S.E.2d at 756.
Id. at 140, 413 S.E.2d at 757.
Id. at 139, 413 S.E.2d at 756.
201 Ga. App. 626, 411 S.E.2d 777 (1991).
Id. at 626, 411 S.E.2d at 778.
Id. at 626-27, 411 S.E.2d at 778.
Id. at 627, 411 S.E.2d at 778-79.

150. Id.
151.

201 Ga. App. 836, 412 S.E.2d 866 (1991).
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oath. "Appellant argued that because the trial court struck the victim's
testimony,. . . the victim was not 'available to testify' [under] O.C.G.A.
section 24-3-16," and that therefore the hearsay testimony of the mother
and police officers was inadmissible. 1 " The court of appeals agreed and
reversed the conviction.'"
The court of appeals thought the trial court erred in striking the victim's testimony. 1" According to O.C.G.A. section 24-9-5(b), "'out-ofcourt statements of a victim of child molestation are admissible whenever
the victim is available to appear at trial, whether or not the child is capable of understanding the nature of an oath and thus regardless of age and
or degree of comprehension.' "15 The victim in this case was not "legally
unavailable" under the statute on the basis of her failure to understand
the oath; but the result of the trial court's incorrect striking of the victim's entire testimony made her "factually unavailable" to testify. 1" According to the court, "[s]ince the result of the trial court's ruling was that
appellant could not confront and cross-examine the victim, she was not
available to testify within the meaning of O.C.G.A. section 24-3-16."'"
Therefore, the hearsay testimony of the mother and police officers was
inadmissible against the appellant.
B. Prior Crimes and Transactions
In Gilstrap v.State,'" the trial court, over objection, permitted the
state to introduce evidence of nine similar transactions before it offered
any evidence concerning the current charge." The supreme court
thought that procedure raised a substantial possibility that the jury could
have determined the guilt of defendant before hearing any evidence on
the indicted offense, but did rot pass on this procedure specifically.'60
The court reversed on the ground that one of the prior "similar transactions" admitted by the trial court concerned an event thirty-one years in
the past. Not surprisingly, the court thought that was a little too remote
to be used against defendant. 101
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id. at 837, 412
Id., 412 S.E.2d
Id., 412 S.E.2d
Id., 412 S.E.2d

S.E.2d at 867.
at 867-68.
at 868.
at 867 (quoting Bright v. State, 197 Ga. App. 784, 785, 400 S.E.2d

18, 18 (1990)).
156. Id. at 837-38, 412 S.E.2d at 868.
157. Id.
158. 261 Ga. 798, 410 S.E.2d 423 (1991).

159. Id. at 799, 410 S.E.2d at 424.
160. Id.
161. Id.
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Justice Benham, concurring in the result, expanded on the reasoning of
the court. As he stated:
Evidence of similar transactions should be inadmissible where allowance of such evidence would be so manifestly unfair as to deny a defendant a reasonable opportunity to prepare an adequate defense. In determining whether such "manifest unfairness" exists, the trial court's
inquiry should include but not be limited to the nature of the similar
offense; its susceptibility to proof; its remoteness in time, with special
attention to the applicable statute of limitation for such similar offense;
the victim; the degree of specificity of the notice given pursuant to
U.S.C.R. 31.3, and the defendant's opportunity to investigate and to
cross-examine at trial.162
In two cases during the survey period the supreme court outlined the
proper procedure the state should follow when seeking to admit evidence
of prior crimes against an accused. In the court's own words,
... before any evidence of independent offenses or acts may be admitted into evidence, a hearing must be held pursuant to Uniform Superior
Court Rule 31.3 (B). At that hearing, the state must make three affirmative showings as to each independent offense or act it seeks to introduce.
The first of these affirmative showings is that the state seeks to introduce
evidence of the independent offense or act, not to raise an improper inference as to the accused's character, but for some appropriate purpose
which has been deemed to be an exception to the general rule of inadmissibility. The second affirmative showing is-that there is sufficient evidence to establish that the accused committed the independent offense
or act. The third is that there is a sufficient connection or similarity between the independent offense or act and the crime charged so that proof
of the former tends to prove the latter. After the 31.3 (B) hearing, and
before any evidence concerning a particular independent offense or act
may be introduced, the trial court must' make a determination that each
of these three showings has been satisfactorily made by the state as to
that particular independent offense or act. [According to a footnote, this
determination by the trial court must be made a part of the record.]
.. . in its presentation to the trier of fact, the state must do more than
merely introduce a certified copy of a conviction and/or indictment into
evidence.
The state must present the trier of fact with evidence establishing both that the accused committed an independent offense or
act and that the connection and/or similarity between that offense or act and the crime charged is such that proof that the

162. Id. at 800, 410 S.E.2d at 425.

184
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tends to prove that the accused
accused committed the former
16
also committed the latter."
In Little v. State,'14 as in Stephens v. State,"'5 and Williams v.
State,'6 the state failed to present to the jury any evidence to establish
the similarity or connection between the prior crimes and the charged
crime, and the courts reversed the convictions. 1 6 7 But note that in Hunter
v. State,1"8 appellant's counsel objected to a prior conviction only on the
ground that it was too remote and not because of a lack of similarity.16' A
majority of the court of appeals held that any objection to the procedure
required for showing similarities of prior crimes was waived." 0 Justice
Sognier dissented on the ground that the state has an affirmative duty to
comply with the above procedures and its failure to do so should call for
reversal regardless of an objection or lack thereof."7
In Maxwell v. State,'7 "[a]ppellant contends that the trial court erred
by permitting the state to introduce evidence concerning three prior incidents involving appellant and his wife. . . . "" The state did not provide
defendant with notice of its intent to present evidence of similar transactions, including prior difficulties between defendant and the victim, at
least ten days before trial. The state argued that defendant had notice of
its intent to present such evidence because defendant was in possession of
the entire 780 page file of the state in this case." 4 The court held that
section 3(b) of Rule 31 requires that the notice be in a specific form to
ensure that the state actually notifies defendant of its intent to use certain evidence so that defendant will have a meaningful opportunity to
rebut that evidence."7 "Burying defendant with paper by providing him
with a copy of its entire case file does not accomplish the state's duty of
notifying defendant of the specific acts it intends to present evidence of
''
to the jury. 117
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C. Prior Crimes-Recidivists Statute
Several cases of interest arose under the italicized portion of O.C.G.A.
section 16-13-30(d), which provides:
Except as otherwise provided, any person who violates subsection (b)
of this Code section'with respect to (specific controlled substances, including cocaine] shall be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof,
shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than five years nor more
than 30 years. Upon conviction
of a second or subsequent offense, he
7
shall be imprisoned for life.'
In Mays v. State,17 8 appellant pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine
with the intent to distribute and received first offender status as part of
his sentence. Four days after the imposition of that sentence he was arrested again for the same offense. The state moved to revoke his probation but the trial court deferred action on that question until the trial on
the new charge. A jury tried Mays and found him guilty of the new
charge. The trial judge then revoked his probation on the original charge
on which he had received first offender status and sentenced him to life
imprisonment on that earlier offense, reasoning that the imposition of the
sentence on the first crime had become the second conviction under the
above statute.17 Appellant argued in vain that the court should look to
the time of commission of the offenses and not to the time of entry of the
convictions. 80
The court agreed that the statute is at best unclear but held that the
legislative intent was to deter repeat offenders and that the trial court's
interpretation was consistent with that purpose.'8 ' Thus, the court held
that the statute should be read to mean that a person must be sentenced
to life on the second conviction rather than the second offense, stating
that their interpretation, while it "does not give precedence to the literal
words of the statute, comports with the legislative intent."' 82
In Dean v. State, 8 the trial court handled the same situation in a
more straightforward way; appellant had his first offender status revoked
after the second conviction. The judge sentenced appellant to five years
on that conviction and then sentenced him to life on the second convic177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(d) (1992) (emphasis added).
200 Ga. App. 457, 408 S.E.2d 714 (1991).
Id. at 457-58, 408 S.E.2d at 715.
Id. at 459, 408 S.E.2d at 716.
Id.
Id. at 459-60, 408 S.E.2d at 717.
200 Ga. App. 752, 409 S.E.2d 667 (1991).
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tion. The court184agreed with the state that this was a valid sentence on the
above statute.

Beasley v. State18 1 is yet another attempt to avoid the harsh consequences of this second offense punishment. Appellant argued that he
could not be sentenced to life before he had received any rehabilitation.188
In that case, appellant was indicted at the same time for a sale of cocaine
on May 5 and for possession with intent to distribute on May 12. He was
tried and convicted for the May 12 offense first, and then convicted on
the May 5 offense. The trial court sentenced him to a life sentence for the
earlier offense. The attorney at the trial complained that the above statute "as applied to these type of cases" violated the Eighth Amendment's
proscription against cruel and unusual punishment, but the trial court
held the statute constitutional.1 87 The court of appeals held that the appellant had waived the claim and did not pass on the contention.1 88 Judge
Beasley, concurring, agreed with the waiver argument but saw a problem
with interpreting the statute to apply to second convictions instead of
second offenses.1 89 She thought the plain language of the statute made it
applicable only "when there is a second conviction and it is for an offense
which occurred after defendant committed an offense and was convicted
of it."' Thus, under the statute, the appellant could not be sentenced to
life for his first offense in time.
Finally, the supreme court granted certiorari in Mays and reversed.8 1
As the court stated:
The rationale for statutes imposing enhanced punishment is that the
repetition of the unlawful conduct aggravates the guilt of the accused by
"[demonstrating] the incorrigible and dangerous character of the accused, thereby establishing the necessity for an enhanced restraint
...." Thus, it is not the date of the conviction which determines the
applicability of enhanced punishment but the date of the commission of
the offense. 192
The supreme court also pointed out that statutes imposing enhanced
punishment must be read in conjunction with O.C.G.A. section 17-10-2,
which provides that any evidence in aggravation of punishment must be
184.
185.
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189.
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19921

CRIMINAL LAW

187

103 Since this was not done,
made known to the defendant prior to trial.
194
also.
basis
the sentence was void on this

C. Jury Selection-The Batson Issue
In Weems v. State, 9 the supreme court addressed the issue of peremptory jury strikes based on racial considerations and closed a loophole
in the Batson' rule that had hampered its enforcement. 107 In Gamble v.
State, 9 the court interpreted Batson to mean that the prosecutor could
rebut a claim of racial, discrimination in the jury strikes either by (1)
showing a valid purpose or by (2) showing that the racial purpose did not
have a discriminatory effect on the composition of the jury. 1"' This second test led to trouble because it ignored the individual juror's right not
to be the subject of racial discrimination; the prosecutor could still strike
on the basis of race as long as the jury had the "requisite" number of
blacks.2 00 This interpretation allowed trial courts to bypass Batson by
simply finding that 'the statistics were right, and no hearing was held to
test the motive of the prosecutor.
The supreme court in Weems struck the "no discriminatory effect" rule
and held that a discriminatory purpose on the part of the prosecution is
all that is necessary to make out a Batson violation.2 0 1 Thus, trial courts
must satisfy themselves in each case that the use of preemptories involves
no discriminatory purpose, and cannot rely on the easy statistical determination concerning the effect of the strikes.201 This change was necessary in light of Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.,203 which extended
the Batson rationale to civil cases.20' After the Supreme Court of Georgia
decided Weems, the United States Supreme Court decided Georgia v.
McCotlum,20 5 which extended Batson to strikes made by defense counsel,

finding that defense- counsel act for the state in that situation.20
193.
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111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
262 Ga. at 102, 416 S.E.2d at 85.
112 S.Ct. 2348 (1992).
Id. at 2350..

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

D. Jury Charges
In Robinson v. State,"'7 the court of appeals affirmed defendant's conviction of two counts of armed robbery2 0 8 The evidence used to convict
defendant consisted of an identification by a victim, the fact that defendant was wearing a red, satin jacket similar to that worn by the robber a
short time later, that defendant removed his jacket when the police came
to his door, and, that he had the opportunity to commit the crimes in
question 2 09 The identification by the victim included some inconsistencies and the trial court granted the petitioner's request to charge the law
of impeachment. However, the court denied counsel's request to charge
the law of circumstantial evidence.210 The court of appeals affirmed the
conviction, followed the rule in Mayfield v. State21 1 and held that the
charge on circumstantial evidence was not warranted when, had the jury
found the eyewitness identification to be impeached, there was no other
evidence on which the jury could rely to convict defendant.2 1
The supreme court reversed and adopted a clear rule concerning when
the rule of circumstantial evidence should be charged.213 The new rule
states that
whe[n] the state's case depends, in whole or in part, on circumstantial
evidence, a charge on the law of circumstantial evidence must be given
on request. This rule will apply whether or not the jury is authorized to
find that the
direct evidence presented by witness testimony has been
21
impeached. '
In Thomas v. State, 5 defendant was charged with the armed robbery
of a car and receiving the car as stolen property. The trial court convicted
defendant of both crimes and sentenced him to consecutive terms of
twenty and ten years for armed robbery and theft by receiving. The court
of appeals was clear that the convictions for both crimes would be impossible, but remedied the situation by vacating the theft by receiving, and
by allowing the armed robbery sentence to stand. 21 The supreme court
reversed, refusing to believe that a jury and trial court so confused would
have convicted defendant of robbery had the jury been properly
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212,
213.
214.
215.
216.

261 Ga. 698, 410 S.E.2d 116 (1991).
199 Ga. App. 368, 405 S.E.2d 101 (1991).
261 Ga. at 698-99 n.1, 410 S.E.2d at 117 n.1.
Id. at 698, 410 S.E.2d at 117.
153 Ga. App. 659, 265 S.E.2d 366 (1980).
261 Ga. at 698-99, 410 S.E.2d at 117.
Id. at 699-700, 410 S.E.2d at 118.
Id.
261 Ga. 854, 413 S.E.2d 196 (1992).
Id. at 854-55, 413 S.E.2d at 197.
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charged.2 1 ' The court expressed no opinion on whether armed robbery
and theft by receiving are mutually exclusive when the indictment alleges
2 18
the retaining of stolen property.
E. PrejudicialEvidence
In Tharpe v. State,2 1 9 Justice Benham, concurring in the result, argues
that Georgia should adopt a rule well, established in Florida which states
that "'a member of the deceased victim's family may not testify for the
purpose of identifying the victim where non-related, credible witnesses
are available to make such identification.' ""0The basis for the rule is to
assure the defendant as dispassionate a trial as possible and to avoid the
emotionally charged atmosphere brought about when a family member
views a photograph taken of a dead loved one.
F. Use of Defendant's Pre-Custody Silence
In Mallory v. State,"' appellant argued that his right to remain silent
was violated when the state introduced a portion of his statement to police that included a question concerning why he had not come forward to
explain his innocence when he knew that he was under investigation and
his answer that he was waiting for police to come to him. '2 The United
States Supreme Court held in Jenkins v.. Anderson,"'8 that "whe[n] no
government action has induced defendant's silence prior to arrest, and
where the defendant waives his privilege against self-incrimination by
testifying at trial, the state may comment at trial upon the fact that he
did not come forward voluntarily. ' 22 4 A decision that the United States

Constitution does allow that certain practice does not mean that the
practice must be allowed in all states. The Supreme Court of Georgia
held that a comment upon a defendant's silence or failure to come forward is far more prejudicial than probative and effective December 26,
1991, is not permissible. 225 This rule applies "even where the defendant
has not 'received Miranda warnings and where he takes the stand in his
own defense. 2 I s This case overrules Fraley v. State.2 7
217. Id. at 856, 413 S.E.2d at 198.
.218.
219.
220.
1981)).
221.
222.
.223.
224.
225.

Id. at 855, 413 S.E.2d at 197.
262 Ga. 110, 416 S.E.2d 78 (1992).
Id. at 116, 416 S.E.2d at 83 (quoting Welty v. State, 402 So. 2d 1159, 1162 (Fla.
261 Ga. 625, 409 S.E.2d 839 (1991).
Id. at 629, 409 S.E.2d at 842.
447 U.S. 231 (1980).
261 Ga. at 629, 409 S.E.2d at 842 (citing Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (1980)).
Id. at 630, 409 S.E.2d at 842-43.

226. Id.
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G. Appeals
In White v.Kelso,2 8 the court refused to hear a pro se petitioner's
habeas which alleged that his trial counsel had been ineffective. 2 9 The
court held that when a new counsel is appointed or retained for appeal
that counsel must raise the ineffectiveness of the trial counsel at the first
280
possible instance in the legal proceeding or this claim would be waived
In Ryan v. Thomas23 three different members of the public defender's
office in Fulton County assisted appellant: one at the trial, one at his motion for new trial, and one on direct appeal.2
23 3

2

The court stated that for

purposes of the White rule, the court would treat these three attorneys
as members of the same law firm for raising claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.2 3' The failure of these three attorneys from the same

office to raise the claim would not bar defendant's right to raise the claim.
In Ford v. State,2 3 defendant's counsel asked the following question on

voir dire: "'[Djo any of you have a relative or close friend Who's ever had
a drug or alcohol problem?'" The trial court, sua sponte, ruled that this
question could not be asked. Appellant's counsel did not except to this
ruling but thanked the trial court and moved on. 23 ' The court of appeals

thought it clear that the trial court abused its discretion in denying that
question, but split on the question of whether the trial court's sua sponte

ruling was preserved for appellate review. 23 7 A majority held that:

"Whe[n], as here, the trial court does make such a sua sponte ruling, an
appellant is not required to attempt to have the trial court reconsider its
adverse ruling as a condition precedent to enumerating that sua sponte
ruling as heir on appeal." 23 8 Four judges disagreed believing that a litigant cannot acquiesce in a ruling and complain about it later.2
227. Id. (overruling Fralen v. State, 256 Ga. 178, 345 S.E.2d 590 (1986)).
228. 261 Ga. 32, 401 S.E.2d 733 (1991).
229. Id. at 32, 401 S.E.2d at 734.
230. Id.
231. 261 Ga. 661, 409 S.E.2d 507 (1991).
232. Id. at 661, 409 S.E.2d at 508.
233. 261 Ga. at 32, 401 S.E.2d at 733.
234. 261 Ga. at 661, 662, 409 S.E.2d at 507, 508.
235.

200 Ga. App. 376, 408 S.E.2d 166 (1991).

236. Id. at 376, 408 S.E.2d at 167.
237. Id. at 377-78, 408 S.E.2d at 167-68.
238. Id. at 377, 408 S.E.2d at 167.
239. Id. at 377-78, 408 S.E.2d at 168.
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VI. GUILTY PLEAS

In Mims v. State,4 0 the court of appeals clarified the procedures applicable to a case in which a defendant seeks to plead guilty while reserving
the opportunity to appeal directly a prior adverse ruling by the trial
court.2 4 ' Appellant Mims filed a motion to suppress in his case and after
denial of the motion, entered a plea of guilty. 'At the time of the plea he
announced his intention to reserve his right to contest the denial of his
motion to suppress, and the trial court permitted Mims to preserve that
2 42
point for appellate review.
The court of appeals took this case as an opportunity to clarify the
procedures applicable in Georgia when a defendant seeks to plead guilty
while reserving the opportunity to appeal directly a prior adverse ruling
by the trial court.2 48 The court held that it is possible to reserve the opportunity to appeal a prior ruling when, entering a guilty plea; however, a
court can only grant a reservation of right when the prosecution expressly
agrees to the reservation in the plea deal.2 4 4 Moreover, trial courts should
use their discretion in accepting a guilty plea and the court makes it clear
that defendants have no right to condition guilty pleas upon reserving the
appeal of any issues, and defendants may only reserve the appeal of such
issues when the trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, allows the
defendant to do so as part of a negotiated plea.2 4 5 In this case, the court
did consider the appellant's argument concerning the motion to suppress
2
and affirmed his conviction. 4
2'4 7
In Priest v. State,
the police arrested appellant and charged him
with possession of a controlled substance and burglary. Appellant negotiated a plea that called for "first offender" status for both offenses and
8
probation. The trial judge thought that O.C.G.A. section 40-5-75w2 com' 9
pelled suspension of appellant's driver's license. " The judge accepted the
plea on the condition that appellant have an opportunity to appeal the
question of the license suspension.2 0 The supreme court held that a defendant who is given first offender treatment has not been "convicted"
within the meaning of O.C.G.A. section 40-5-75 and that mandatory

240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

201 Ga. App. 277, 410'S.E.2d 824 (1991).
Id. at 278, 410 S.E.2d at 825.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 279, 410 S.E.2d at 825.
Id.
261 Ga. 651, 409 S.E.2d 657 (1991).
O.C.G.A. § 40-5-75 (Supp. 1992).
261 Ga. at 651, 409 S.E.2d at 658.
Id.
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driver's license suspension is not required.2 1 Therefore, the trial court
had the discretion to suspend this sentence or not depending on the facts
of the case before it. It is of interest that an entry of a guilty plea to a
traffic violation, even if treated as a first offender situation, is treated as a
"conviction" under O.C.G.A. section 40-5-75 and requires the suspension
of the license.
VII. DOUBLE JEOPARDY
In Harris v. State,212 appellant pleaded guilty to theft by taking. The

property in question was a rental car, and due to a mix-up at the time of
the plea, restitution was ordered to a lessee victim in the amount of $600.
After being notified of the $600 restitution figure, the lessee's attorney
filed a motion to modify the restitution order to provide for additional
restitution for an amount over $2600. A second hearing was held and,
over the defendant's objections, a trial court, expressing some concern,
increased the restitution to the amount demanded. Appellant argued that
this increase in restitution was an increase in his punishment after he had
entered upon the execution of his sentence and was therefore invalid." 5
The question thus arose whether an increase in the amount of restitution,
awarded as a condition of probation, is an increase in punishment or an
increase in the nonpunitive aspect of the probation portion of the sentence.254 Over a strong dissent by Judge Birdsong, the court held that
restitution is more akin to civil damages than to punishment and affirmed
the increase in restitution. 55 As the court stated, "When error 'in determining the amount of damages was discovered, the proper procedure for
correcting the error was to reopen the issue for further evidence and a
new finding on the amount of damages, including the lessor's damages."1 2 5

Judge Birdsong, in a dissent joined by Judge McMurray,

thought it clear that the increased restitution was an increase in the punishment of the appellant and thus violated the Fifth Amendment prohibi5
tion against double jeopardy.1 7

The supreme court reversed, 55 rejecting the state's argument that restitution is a civil remedy for the victim and not a criminal penalty.2 5 '
Holding that restitution is punishment when ordered as part of a criminal
251.

Id. at 652, 409 S.E.2d at 659.

252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

200 Ga. App. 841, 410 S.E.2d 123 (1991).
Id. at 841-42, 410 S.E.2d at 123.
Id. at 842-43, 410 S.E.2d at 124.
Id. at 843, 410 S.E.2d at 124.
Id. at 844, 410 S.E.2d at 125.
Id. (Birdsong, J., dissenting).
Harris v. State, 261 Ga. 859, 413 S.E.2d 439 (1992).
Id. at 860, 413 S.E.2d at 441.
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sentence, the court held that the sentencing court may not increase a sentence once the defendant begins serving it, without violating prohibitions
against double jeopardy in both the Georgia and federal constitutions.2 0
In Platt v. State 2 ' the state convicted and sentenced defendant for
trafficking in cocaine on September 21, 1989.262 On February 26, 1990, the
trial court granted defendant's motion for a new trial on the basis that
the state had failed to prove defendant was in possession of cocaine or a
mixture containing more than ten percent cocaine. 2 0 On March 1, 1990
the state moved for a reconsideration, and on May 15, 1990 the trial court
reaffirmed its granting of a motion for a new trial.2 64 In a separate paragraph the court found the evidence" (legally insufficient to sustain a conviction of trafficking cocaine, but

. . .

ample

. . .

to sustain a conviction

of possession of cocaine:)" 2 The court then sentenced defendant for possession of cocaine.26 s Defendant claimed a violation of double jeopardy in
this case but the court brushed it aside stating that the overall effect of
the May 15 order was to amend the order granting the motion for a new
trial, rather than to grant the motion for a new trial and to find the defendant guilty of possession.2 7 Chief Judge Sognier dissented, on the obvious grounds that no defendant may be sentenced after a new trial is
granted but has not yet occurred, and in addition that the trial court's
26 6
actions were barred by double jeopardy.
In Potts v. State,2 69 a death penalty case, appellant raised double jeopardy issues relying on Grady v. Corbin. Potts kidnapped the victim in
Cobb County, took him to Forsyth County, and shot him in the head,
killing him. He was prosecuted in Cobb County for kidnapping with bodily injury and in Forsyth County for the offense of murder. He was tried
in Forsyth County and sentenced to death and then tried in Cobb County
for the kidnapping with bodily injury and sentenced to death for that
offense also.2 7 ' The appellant raised double jeopardy claims against these

successive trials, basing his claim on the recently decided Grady v.
Corbin.2 7

260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.

The supreme court held that,

Id. at 860-61, 413 S.E.2d at 441.
200 Ga. App. 784, 409 S.E.2d 878 (1991).
Id. at 784, 409 S.E.2d at 878.
Id., 409 S.E.2d at 878-79.
Id., 409 S.E.2d at 879.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 785, 409 S.E.2d at 879.
Id. at 786, 409 S.E.2d at 880 (Sognier, J., dissenting).
261 Ga. 716, 410 S.E.2d 89 (1991).
506 U.S. 508 (1990).
261 Ga. at 716, 410 S.E.2d at 91.
Id. at 720, 410 S.E.2d at 93.
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[w]he[n], as here, a criminal defendant goes on a multi-county crime
spree, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not preclude successive prosecutions in separate counties for separate crimes arising out of a single criminal episode-even if they have factual elements in common-whe[n]
they are not the "same offense" as a matter of fact or of law.23
The court found that kidnapping the victim in one county and shooting
him in another county were two separate crimes that were not the same
in law or in fact and allowed the convictions to stand 2 7
VIII. SPEEDY TRiAL
In State v. Collins,2" defendant on parole was arrested on new charges
in June 1989. He was returned to the penitentiary and no-hold or detainer was placed against him by the prosecution in the new case. On
November 9, 1989, defendant was indicted on the new crime and thereafter filed a demand for a trial. The defendant, who did nothing to prevent
his case from being brought before a jury, was not tried during the two
completed terms following his demand for trial.278 The superior court
granted defendant's motion to acquit pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 17-7170277 and the state appealed.2 78 Since no detainer was filed against de280
fendant, O.C.G.A. section 42-6-3119 is inapplicable to this case.
The state contended that defendant did not comply with the requirements of O.C.G.A. section 17-7-170 because he was not physically present
and ready for trial during both terms of court following his demand.2
The court refused to read into O.C.G.A. section 17-7-170 the requirements of O.C.G.A. section 17-7-171(b), 2 which require presence in court
announcing ready for trial. 283 The second statute applies only to capital
offenses and the court held it not applicable to the statute at bar.28 '

273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.

Id.
Id. at 719, 410 S.E.2d at 93.
201 Ga. App. 500, 411 S.E.2d 546 (1991).
Id. at 500, 411 S.E.2d at 547.
O.C.G.A. § 17-7-170 (1990).
201 Ga. App. at 500, 411 S.E.2d at 547.
O.C.G.A. § 46-2-3 (1991).
201 Ga. App. at 500, 411 S.E.2d at 547.
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 17-7-171(b) (1990).
201 Ga. App. at 500, 411 S.E.2d at 547.
Id.
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A.
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MISCELLANEOUS CASES

Appointed Attorney's Pay

In Sacandy v. Walther, " a Rome lawyer brought an action against the
superior court judges of the circuit, challenging the circuit's Indigent Defense Program. The program provides indigent defense services through a
panel of state bar members residing or maintaining offices in Floyd
County, who have been admitted to practice for less than fifteen years, as
2
well as lawyers who request the inclusion of their names in the panel. 5
Lawyers who have not handled criminal defense matters, or decide that
they lack experience to take a case, "shall be appointed as uncompensated co-counsel in a sufficient number of criminal matters so that the
attorney shall, when said attorney certifies that he or she is prepared to
do so, assume active participation as sole defense counsel in indigent
f,287
criminal matters ....
The attorney in question did not care for the adjective "uncompensated" and brought this action. The trial court rejected her claims under
state and federal constitutions and held that it was her. professional obligation to serve as an uncompensated appointed counsel under the
program.2 88
The court of appeals rejected Sacandy's argument that the superior
court judges are not authorized to appoint counsel, but did agree that the
program was unenforceable insofar as it authorizes the appointment of
uncompensated counsel, even under limited circumstances.2" The court
quoted Birt v. State,2 1 to the effect that "' "it is the policy of this state
to provide. . . [a]dequate compensation for counsel who represent indigent persons accused of crime ....
"291
Plaintiff in Sacandy also argued that she should not be required to
participate in the Program because she had no experience or interest in
criminal law. The court thought that lack of interest or experience is not
2 92
a reason for excluding a lawyer from participation in the program.

285.
286.

262 Ga. 11, 413 S.E.2d 727 (1992).
Id. at 11, 411 S.E.2d at 728-29.

287.

Id., 413 S.E.2d at 729.

288.
289.
290.
291.
S.E.2d
292.

Id. at 12, 413 S.E.2d at 729.
Id.
259 Ga. 800, 387 S.E.2d 879 (1990).
262 Ga. at 13, 413 S.E.2d at 729-30 (quoting Birt v. State, 259 Ga. 800, 800, 387
879, 880 (1990) (quoting O.C.G.A. § 17-12-31 (1990)).
Id. at 13-14, 413 S.E.2d at 730.
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B. Homicide-Seat Belt Case
In the case of Whitener v. State,2 03 appellant was convicted of homicide by vehicle in the first degree. She argued, among other things, that
she should not be found guilty of the crime "because the victim was not
wearing a seat belt at the time of the collision."2 Defendant argued that
the victim's failure to wear a seat belt ought to be considered in determining the cause of death.2 9 The court responded that the victim's failure to wear a seat belt plays no role in determining defendant's'guilt of
vehicular homicide.2 9e Quoting State v. Dodge 2 97 the court stated that,
while the victim's failure to wear a seat belt may be a proximate cause of
her own death, it could not sensibly be described as an intervening cause.
Finding that appellant's conduct was a "substantial factor" in causing the
victim's death, her conduct was the proximate cause of the death and the
conviction must stand. "98
C. Fair Trials and the First Amendment
In Bryant v. State," the court of appeals disapproved of a large display in the entrance of the county courthouse. The display, erected by
Mother's Against Drunk Drivers, pictured the faces of forty-nine people
killed in Georgia by drunken drivers. The court of appeals held that defendant's right to a fair and impartial jury outweighed any First Amendment right to express anti-DUI sentiments in the entrance of the lobby of
the courthouse on the day of jury trials. However, the court found that
the six jurors who saw the display answered correctly that they could disfrom their minds in the case before them and affirmed the
miss the poster
3 00
conviction.
D. Multiple Personalities
In Kirby v.State, 0 1 appellant asked the court of appeals to overrule
Kirkland v. State30 and hold that a person suffering from a multiple
personality disorder should be absolved of criminal responsibility. The
appellant argued that since 1983 advances in the study of multiple per293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.

201 Ga. App. 309, 410 S.E.2d 796 (1991).
Id. at 311, 410 S.E.2d at 798.
Id.
Id.
567 A.2d 1143 (Vt. 1989).
201 Ga. App. at 311, 410 S.E.2d at 798 (citing State v. Dodge, 567 A.2d at 1144).
201 Ga. App. 305, 410 S.E.2d 778 (1991).
Id. at 305-06, 410 S.E.2d at 779.
201 Ga. App. 116, 410 S.E.2d 333 (1991).
166 Ga. App. 478, 304 S.E.2d 561 (1983).
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sonality disorders rendered Kirkland obsolete, 08 but the court of appeals
refused to4 overrule Kirkland and allowed the verdict of guilty but mentally ill.30

303.
304.

201 Ga. App. at 117, 410 S.E.2d at 334.
Id. at 118, 410 S.E.2d at 335.

